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Abstract 
The endowment effect, which predicts undertrading and a willingness-to-accept greater than 
willingness-to-pay, is studied using responses that remove all reference to buying or selling and 
focuses only on choice tasks. The results significantly lower the willingness-to-pay/willingness-to-
accept discrepancy, but the latter is still significant. A high efficiency open display uniform price 
auction is used to exchange mugs for money. Since mugs are randomly assigned to half of 2N 
subjects, NI2 mugs are predicted to trade. Less than NI2 mugs trade on average, but more than 
previously reported. The phenomenon exists but is less prominent than reported previously. 
JEL classification: C91; C92 
Keywords: Experimental economics; Choice behavior 
1. Introduction 
1.1. The endowment effect 
Individual decision-making studies have shown that human subjects reveal an 
asymmetric response pattem toward los ses (los s aversion) as contrasted with gains 
measured relative to any individual's initial status quo position (Kahneman and Tversky, 
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1979). Consequently, if one's initial wealth endowment is Xo, then the hypothesis is that 
the utility function, u(·), has the property that UI(XO-~X»U'(Xo+~ for aIl deviations 
~ from any initial Xa- AIthough Kahneman and Tversky (1979) were concemed with 
prospect theory as a modification of utility theory for risky decision, in a fundamental 
extension Thaler argued that "many of the elements of prospect theory can be used in 
developing descriptive choice models in deterministic settings" (Thaler, 1980, p.4l). 
Thaler observed that the utility property, U'(XO-~>U'(XO+~X) implies that out-of-
pocket costs are more heavily weighted in utility assessments than opportunity costs; i.e. 
a forgone gain has lower utility value than the actual loss of the same amount. This 
cognitive underweighting of opportunity costs by the individual was referred to as the 
"endowment effect," and was used to explain a number of questionnaire survey 
examples. 
Subsequently, Kahneman et al., 1991 (KKT) suggested that the discrepancy 
between willingness-to-pay (WTP) and willingness-to-accept (WTA), widely 
observed in hypothetical surveys and in motivated exchange experiments, were all 
manifestations of the endowment effect. (See KKT, Table 1 for a summary.) However, 
they argue (KKT, p.1327) that the endowment effect does not apply when goods 
are purchased for resale rather than use. Thus there is no endowment effect for the 
retail firm, only for the consumer purchasing the firm's goods. Similarly, they note 
that it does not apply to the exchange of tokens (or rights) to which private redemp-
tion values, or induced values, have been assigned by the experimenter (Smith, 
1976). EmpiricaIly, they show this to be approximately the case in experiments 
establishing an endowment effect for ComeIl and other coffee mugs but not for induced 
value tokens. 
The results of nine experiments are reported by KKT. Sorne of these were exchange 
experiments, others were choice experiments using the (Becker et al., 1964) procedure. In 
Section l we discuss their choice experiments, introduce our modifications in their 
procedures, and present the new resuIts. We replicate their procedures in pure choice 
experiments by removing all references to 'buying' and 'selling.' The purpose is to 
remove all differential strategic motivation that might be suggested by these terms. In 
Section 2 we discuss their exchange experiments and present the results of 10 new 
exchange experiments using the uniform-price double-auction mechanism which, 
because of its real time information feedback features, achieves high efficiency in 
single-period exchange. 
2. Choice tests of the endowment effect 
2.1. The KKT experiments 
In their typical choice experiment half of a group of subjects are randomly designated 
sellers and the others buyers. University coffee mugs costing about $6 in the local 
University bookstore, are then distributed to the sellers, and all buyers are given the 
opportunity to examine a mugo The following forms are then executed by all sellers 
[buyers] (see KKT, p.178 for their instructions). 
2
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If the price is $0 
If the price is $0.50 
If the price is $9.50 
1 will sell 
[buy] 
1 will keep 
[not buy] the mug 
For example, on this form a seller might indicate a preference for keeping the mug for 
all prices at or below $5.00, selling it at all prices aboye $5.00. The subject's WTA would 
then be as ses sed at $5.25. 
After the forms were executed an equally likely price was drawn from the list between 
$0 and $9.50, and exchanges based on this price were conducted by the experimenter? 
The results of their experiment 5 were typical of those reponed by KKT: The median 
selling price, $5.75, is more than double the median buying price, which is consistent 
with an endowment effect. But, as recognized by KKT, this interpretation is clouded by 
the fact that the experiment did not control for the income effect in standard preference 
theory. 
To address this objection KKT (pp.179,180) use three groups instead of two: sellers, 
buyers and choosers. The sellers/buyers make the same sales/purchase decisions as 
before, while the choosers are asked to choose at each prospective price between the mug 
or cash. Thus sellers are given a mug, and choosers are given the right to either a mug or 
cash as they choose; any income effect on sellers as distinct from buyers, should also 
apply to choosers. 
KKT repon median prices for the three groups for each of the two experiments (KKT, 
experiments 6 and 7, pp.179,180). Mean prices for their data are shown in the first row of 
Table 1: choosers behave much more like buyers than sellers, although choosers value 
mugs sixty percent more highly than buyers. 
Table I 
Mean WTA and WTP for university emblem mugs 
Experiment WTA WTP WTA WTA-SI WTA-SI Sample 
sellers buyers choosers WTP-B WTA-C size, N 
KKT6 a and7 b $6.89 $1.91 $3.05 3.61 1.60 194 
WTA WTP WTA WTA-1I WTA-1I 
Group I Group 2 Group 3 WTP-2 WTA-3 
UofA e $5.36 $2.19 $3.88 2.45 1.38 120 
a Mugs and subjects from Simon Fraser University. 
b Mugs and subjects from University of British Columbia. Price tags were left on the mugs. 
e Mugs and subjects from University of Arizona. All subjects make choices: In Group 1, each is endowed with a 
mug; Group 2, each is endowed only with the money eamed in a pre-experiment; and Group 3, each is endowed 
with the right to choose either a mug or additional money. 
2In sorne experiments the ordered individual WTPs and WTAs are crossed and the exchange is directly 
between buyers and sellers at a common clearing price. But in these cases it is no longer true "that your decision 
can have no effect on the price ... ," as stated in the KKT instructions (p.178). 
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2.2. Choice experiments controlling for differential instruction effects 
Since it was these last two experiments that were critical to the hypothesized 
endowment effect, we conducted four experiments each with 24 subjects (8 in each 
group); motivated by the three-group designo However, we made several instructional 
changes which, we conjectured, might be of substance. 
Psychologically, 'buying', 'selling' and 'choosing' are distinct emotive terms. The first 
two are laden with strategic connotations - buyers are motivated to buy low, sellers to sell 
high - while 'choosing' appears to be not so laden. To control for effects due only to 
differences in the KKT wording of the tasks for each of the three groups of subjects we 
neutralized our instructions so that each group was presented with a choice task, not 
'buying,' 'selling' and 'choice' tasks. Our instructions, common for all subjects, and the 
choice sheet for each of the three groups, now referred to with antiseptic evenness as 
Group 1, Group 2, and Group 3, are shown in an appendix supplied on request. Each 
member of Group 1 is an owner of an Arizona Wildcat Mug, and their task is to choose, 
for each amount of money (not a 'price'), between retaining their mug, or accepting the 
additional amount of money. Each member of Group 2 is designated as having the right to 
choose between accepting a mug or retaining an amount of money out of their earnings in 
a previous experiment in the same session. Finally, each person in Group 3 is designated 
as having the righf to choose between accepting a mug or accepting an additional amount 
of money. Thus, all subjects are symmetrically described as choosers, but under different 
initial conditions. 
All of our experiments were run at the end of two simultaneously posted offer market 
experiments (6 buyers, 6 sellers in each), reported in Franciosi et al. (1994). The positions 
of Groups 1, 2 and 3 were assigned at random among the 24 subjects. All subjects were 
paid their earnings in cash at the end of the market experiments. Earnings ranged from 
$8.75 to $44.50, providing all Group 2 subjects with adequate funds to give up for a mug 
if they chose. 
The mean monetary amounts ('prices') for each of Groups 1,2 and 3 are shown in the 
second data row of Table l. The mugs were priced at $9.95 (price tags removed) in the 
campus bookstore. 
From Table 1 our subjects reported a substantially lower Group 1, WTA, a somewhat 
higher WTP, and a higher Group 3, WTA, than did the KKT subjects. Substituting a 
choice task for the buying and selling tasks appears to narrow substantially the WTAI 
WTP discrepancy. But from Table 2 row 1, the t-test shows that all pairwise comparisons 
of our three groups come from different distributions. Row 2 compares the KKT results 
with ours and shows that the reduction in selling prices and the increase in buying prices 
are significant using the Wilcoxon test. Since these comparisons did not control for 
differences due to subjects and experimenters, we cannot attribute them only to the 
treatment differences. 
We also asked if being in the role of buyer or seller in the prior market experiments 
affected the value revealed for a mugo The effect was insignificant using the Epps-
Singleton test (a=0.37). Finally, we asked if the amount paid to subjects in the prior 
market experiments affected their revealed values in the mug experiment. A regression of 
4
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Table 2 
Group distribution differences and comparisons with KKT results for Buyers, Sellers and Choosers using I-tests 
Hypotheses 
G1=G2 G2=G3 G3=G1 
Group 1-3 1=7.33 1=-4.01 1==-2.98 
a=O.OOO a=O.OOO a= 0.004 
G1=S G2=B G3=C 
KKT S, B and C Groups 1=-3.73 1=1.10 1=2.12 
a=O.OO a= 0.27 a=O.04 
the latter on the former yielded no significant relationship (R2=0.OO7). This suggests 
that any 'house money' income effect on mug valuation is nil (Thaler and Johnson, 
1990). 
3. Exchange tests of the endowment etTect 
3.1. The KKT exchange experiments 
In addition to their choice experiments, KKT report the results of several exchange 
experiments. The typical experiment proceeds as follows. Of 2N subjects, N are 
randomly designated buyers, and N sellers. The latter are each endowed with a mug; 
the former use their own money. Buyers each submit a bid price to buy a mug, sellers 
each submit an offer price to sell their mugo Their 'bids' or 'offers' are solicited by asking 
each subject to choose between a price and a mug for a series of prices as in the 
choice procedure. The bids (WTP's) of the subjects are then ordered from highest to 
lowest, while the offers (WTA's) are similarly ordered from lowest to highest. The 
intersection of these reported supply and demand schedule s determines the price and 
quantity exchanged. If there are no endowment or income effects, then due to the 
random allocation of subjects to the buy or sell category the supply schedule of 
those given the mugs should be the symmetric mirror image of the demand schedule 
for those not given the cups; Le. (demand):=D(P*)=S(P*)=N-D(P*) and D(P*)=NI2. 
Consequently, the prediction is that N/2 mugs will trade. For example (KKT, 
pp.170-l73), with 44 subjects, and N=22 buyers and 22 sellers, 11 mugs are predicted 
to trade. In fact, between one and four trade at prices between $4.25 and $4.75. Although 
there are several bid/offer trials, only one is chosen at random to be binding. Table 3 
summarizes their results for induced value tokens, mugs, and pens for all trials in four 
experiments. 
According to the endowment hypothesis the predicted number of trades will be realized 
for induced value tokens, since one is simply trading dollars for identical dollar claims: in 
5
218 R. Franciosi el al.! J. 01 Economic Behavior & Org. 858 (1996) 213-226 
Table 3 
Experiment Trial Number Object Price Observed Predicted 
subjects trades trades 
44 Tokens $3.75 12 II 
2 44 Tokens $4.75 11 1I 
3 44 Tokens $4.25 10 II 
4 44 Mugs $4.25 4 II 
5 44 Mugs $4.75 1 11 
6 44 Mugs $4.50 2 11 
7 44 Mugs $4.25 2 I1 
8 44 Pens $1.25 4 I1 
9 44 Pens $1.25 5 1I 
10 44 Pens $1.25 4 11 
11 44 Pens $1.25 5 11 
2 38 Tokens $3.75 10 10 
2 2 38 Tokens $4.75 9 10 
2 3 38 Tokens $4.25 7 8 
2 4 38 Mugs $1.75 3 9.5 
2 5 38 Mugs $2.25 3 9.5 
2 6 38 Mugs $2.25 2 9.5 
2 7 38 Mugs $2.25 2 9.5 
2 8 38 Binoculars $1.25 4 9.5 
2 9 38 Binoculars $.75 4 9.5 
2 10 38 Binocu1ars $.75 3 9.5 
2 11 38 Binoculars $.75 3 9.5 
3 1 26 Tokens a 5 6.5 
3 2 26 Pens a 2 6.5 
3 3 26 Pens a 2 6.5 
3 4 26 Pens a 2 6.5 
3 5 26 Pens a 6.5 
4 1 74 Tokens a 15 18.5 
4 2 74 Tokens a 16 18.5 
4 3 64 Mugs a 6 18.5 
4 4 74 Mugs a 4 18.5 
4 5 72 Mugs a 4 18 
4 6 73 Mugs a 8 18 
4 7 74 Mugs a 8 18.5 
a Prices are not reported in experiments 3 and 4. In these experiments "the subjects were asked for minimum 
selling or maximum buying prices rather than answer the series of 'yes or no' questions used in Experiments 1 
and 2" (KKT, p.175). 
fact, on average there is undertrading (in experiments 2, 3 and 4 but not 1). This is 
consistent with other studies showing a tendency to underreveal (token) demand aml/or 
supply by subjects in uniform price sealed bid institutions (Smith et al., 1982). But with 
consumer goods (mugs, pens) there is substantial undertrading - much less than half the 
6
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predicted volume is observed to trade.3 If there are income effects, then the demand by 
subjects not endowed with mugs, d(P)<D(P), the demand by the endowed subjects. 
Hence d(P*)=N-D(P*)<N-d(P*) and d(P*)<N/2. But our finding reported aboye, 
showing no income effect, suggests that this cannot account for the results in Table 3.4 
We should add that the KKT procedure does produce an incentive to underreveal 
demand (supply). When subjects are asked to choose between an object and a price, they 
know that their crossover price is, in effect, a bid price for a buyer and an ask price for a 
seller. Then "the market price was the point at which the elicited supply and demand 
curves intersected." (KKT, footnote 2, p.171). This procedure mean s that if the highest 
accepted ask, AH<BL, the lowest accepted bid, then there are many prices that clear the 
market. The typical (fair?) procedure is to set the clearing price at Pe=(AH+Bd/2. The 
mug price in tri al 6 of experiment 1 is an example in which Pe is halfway between the 
discrete values $4.25 and $4.75 on the subject's choice formo If subjects believe that 
AH<BL is a possible outcome it pays any seller (who may tum out to be the marginal 
seller) to 'ask' more than her WTA (or marginal buyer to 'bid' below his WTP). Since the 
distribution of the consumer good object values is highly uncertain, and unknown to both 
the subjects and the experimenters, the incentive to misrepresent may be more 
pronounced than with tokens. 
3.2. The uniform price double auction mechanism 
There exists a trading institution which results in a single block trade called the 
Uniform Price Double Auction but which has the real time feedback characteristics of the 
continuous double auction, it has been extensively studied in the laboratory, (McCabe et 
al., 1993, Friedman, 1991). Bids and offers are displayed in real time, and continuously 
crossed to yield a provisional clearing price and quantity while the market is open. When 
the trading period ends, alI trades become binding at the price and quantity standing at the 
close. This institution is particularly well suited for examining the exchange predictions 
of the endowment effect because it has been shown to have excellent revelation properties 
for marginal units, resulting in fully efficient exchange. 
Table 4 and Fig. 1 illustrate the state of alI bid and offer realizations at the market 
close for a typical trading period in an experiment (period 12, experiment 7302 below). 
The first column lists the identification number of each buyer, followed by that buyer's 
bid (column 2). The rank order (high-to-low of bids, low-to-high of offers) is shown in 
column 3. Column 4 displays each seller's offer followed by the seller's identification 
number in column 5. The horizontalline below the 6th ranked bid and offer separates the 
accepted bids and offers aboye from the rejected bids and offers below the lineo The 
accepted bids and offers form contracts at a uniform price (3001t in Table 4 ). Several 
3Sometimes it has been suggested that subjects ttade in induced value experiments because they think the 
experimenter expects it and brought them to the ¡ab for this purpose. TIte KKT results are quite contrary to this 
interpretation. 
40ne could also use our WTP and WTA data from the choice experiments to determine a hypothetical 
exchange quantity based upon the BDM elicitation procedures. We performed this exercise by crossing the 
Group I WTA with the Group 2 WTP and found that of 20 predicted trades only 8 would occur. TItis 
undertrading is consistent with the findings of KKT. If we use the Group 3 data as a better estimate of 'troe 
WTA' and cross these with the Group 2 WTP, we still get only 12 of 20 predicted trades. 
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Table 4 
Bid, offers and trades uniform price double auction experiment 7302, period 12 
ID No. Bid Rank Offer ID No. 
2 400 220 19 
6 325 2 290 24 
9 310 3 300 22 
4 310 4 300 21 
II 301 5 300 17 
12 300 6 300 27 
10 311 7 329 25 
7 300 8 330 26 
300 9 347 18 
8 280 10 362 23 
5 270 11 380 20 
3 200 12 
C.E. Price $32M!" , C.E. Volume 7 
Mrkt Price $3M!"M!" , Mrkt Volume 6 
$ 
O 
6lZ 
57M!" ----, , 
, 
53.0' , 
----, 
49M!" 
----. 
45.0' I I 
I 
41.0' ----, 
37M!" 
33.0' 
29M!" 
---, 
25M!" , 1 
I I 
---_1 1 21M!" 1 1 
I 
1 
17M!" - ___ 1 
13M!" I ____ 1 
1 
9fJ 
-- __ 1 
5fJ 1 I 
1 
--_1 
lfJ 12~3<; fJ 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1.0' 1 1 
Fig. 1. Graph of induced supply and demand, and of bidloffer realizations UPDA experiment 7302, period 12. 
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altemative information feedback and price algorithm procedures for this mechanisms 
have been studied. We use the procedure in which subjects see displayed in real time only 
the best rejected bid and offer (311 and 329 in Table 4 ). This places maximum pressure 
on the outside traders to reach agreement, and has been found to yield the highest 
exchange volume and market efficiency (McCabe et al., 1993, p.320). 
In Fig. 1 the demand bids (supply offers) are plotted as solid line steps. AIso plotted, 
as broken line steps, are the induced value or cost of each trader. Note the substantial 
value/cost underrevelation, which does not thereby impede the efficient exchange of 
six units. 
3.3. Mug exchange using the uniform price mechanism 
We report the results of two series of experiments. In each experiment 24 
different subjects were randomly assigned to groups of 12 buyers and 12 sellers. Each 
series was divided into Parts 1 and 2 (see Table 5). In Part 1 of Series 1 each buyer was 
assigned a value and each seller a cost by a random draw with replacement from the 
uniform distribution on [$0, $9.99] at the beginning of each of 10 (or 12) trading 
periods. This baseline served as a training session. All periods lasted 4 minutes. In Part 2, 
Series 1 and 2, each buyer was endowed with a $9.99 cash balance which was theirs to 
keep if no mug was purchased; each seller was endowed with a University of Arizona 
emblem mug priced at $9.95 in the University bookstore and was theirs to keep if not 
soldo Each subject was paid in cash all of his/her eamings from the induced value 
training experiments in Part 1 of each of the sessions. In series 2, Part 1 used the constant 
volume equilibrium environment shown in Fig. 1, but in each period a random constant 
was added to each value, and the values randomly assigned to individuals. Part 2 of 
series 2 was like that of series 1 except that the price tag ($9.95) was left on each mug, 
and this was pointed out to the subjects. This was as a treatment to reduce uncertainty 
conceming the cash or market value of the mug in each group. AIso in series 2 we 
increased the trading time for the mug exchange from 4 to 6 min in four of the six 
experiments. This is because it appeared that the subjects were still adjusting their 
bids and offers when the period ended after 4 mino Table 5 summarizes the experimental 
designo 
Table 5 
Description of treatments in exchange experiments 
Part 1 
Part 2 
Number of 
Experiments 
(subjects) 
Series 1 
Induced Values [$0, $9.99]; 
random equilibrium; 4 min periods 
Buyers: $9.99Sellers: one mug 
each; 4 min periods 
4 (96) 
Series 2 
Induced Values [$0, $9.99]; 
constant equilibrium; 4 min periods 
Buyers: $9.99 each. Sellers: one mug 
each; 4 and 6 min periods 
$9.95 tag left on mug 
6 (144) 
9
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3.4. Results of exchange experiments 
Table 6 lists the predicted competitive equilibrium volume, and corresponding 
observed trading volume in periods 1-10 for the random equilibrium induced value 
environment. The induced value results are those recorded for periods 1-10 in four 
experiments. The mug exchange volume is recorded in period 11 for each experiment, 
with the corresponding clearing price shown in parentheses. 
Table 7 lists the volume data for the experiments using a constant equilibrium volume 
environment for periods 1-12 in the training baseline. Period 13 records the volume in the 
subsequent mug exchange experiments, with the clearing price shown in parentheses. 
In both Tables 6 and 7 as we move from induced value exchange to mug exchange, 
volume relative to the prediction is decreased. But comparing the mug exchange volume 
in Tables 6 and 7 with the various objects exchanged in Table 3 it is clear that our 
exchange mechanism results in much less undertrading than was observed by KKT. In 
three of our ten experiments half or more of the mugs trade as predicted by standard 
theory. 
Since earnings in the induced value experiments vary from zero to $34, we can 
ask if there are any income effects on the submitted bids or offers of subjects in the 
mug experiments. Separate regressions of such bids (offers) on earnings for buyers 
and for seIlers yield no significant effect of earnings on subject WTP or WTA for a 
mug (the regression coefficients yield t-values of -0.28 for sellers and -0.20 for 
buyers). 
Each mug exchange experiment provides a sample of bid and offer prices standing at 
the close of each experimento Since the exchange mechanism provides fuIl opportunity 
for each subject to adjust his or her bid or offer price to the level needed to produce a 
Table 6 
Volume traded in exchange experiments series 1, random equilibrium h 
UPDA 5282 6012 7162 7232 
experiment a 
Trading Volume Volume Volume Volume 
period predicted observed predicted observed predicted observed predicted observed 
8 8 7 6 6 5 5 5 
2 7 8 6 5 5 5 6 7 
3 6 6 4 4 6 6 6 5 
4 8 7 5 5 7 6 7 6 
5 4 5 7 6 7 6 7 7 
6 6 6 7 6 6 6 5 4 
7 7 6 6 5 6 5 5 4 
8 6 5 8 7 6 5 6 5 
9 5 5 7 7 5 5 5 5 
10 7 6 5 4 6 5 6 6 
II e 6 6(1 89¡t) 6 3(300¡t) 6 3(lOO¡t) 6 4(101¡t) 
a Experiment numbers refer to date experiment was conducted, e.g. 5282: May 28, 1992. 
b In each period, 1-10, values were drawn witb replacement from the uniform distribution on [$0, $9.99]. 
e Volume for number of mugs traded in period 11. Price in cents is shown in parenthesis. 
10
Table 7 
Volume traded in exchange experiments series 2, constant equilibrium a four and six minute mug trading periods 
UPDA 7302 b 1062 b 10152 b 01263 e 01283 e 02193 e 02243 e 
experiment a 
~ 
Trading Volume Volume Volume Volume Volume Volume Volume ir 
period ;" 
" 
predicted observed predicted observed predicted observed predicted observed predicted observed predicted observed predicted observed IS' ~. 
6--7 6 6--7 8 6--7 8 6--7 6 6--7 7 6--7 7 6--7 6 ~ ., 
2 6-7 6 6--7 7 6--7 7 6-7 6 6--7 6 6--7 6 6--7 6 <:::: 
6 6--7 6 6--7 6--7 6 6--7 
;.. 
3 6--7 8 6--7 7 6--7 7 6 
.Q., 
4 6--7 7 6--7 7 6--7 6 6-7 6 6--7 7 6--7 5 6--7 6 ~ 5 6--7 6 6-7 7 6--7 7 6--7 6 6--7 7 6--7 7 6--7 6 e ;" 
6 6-7 6 6--7 6 6--7 6 6-7 6 6--7 6 6--7 6 6--7 6 e ;; 
7 6-7 6 6--7 6 6--7 6 6-7 7 6-7 7 6-7 6 6-7 6 ¡:;. 
8 6--7 6 6--7 6 6--7 5 6-7 6 6-7 7 6--7 6 6-7 6 I:>:l 
'" ;:,-9 6--7 6 6-7 6 6-7 7 6-7 7 6--7 6 6-7 6 6-7 6 .,
'" 10 6--7 6 6--7 6 6--7 7 6--7 7 6-7 6 6-7 6 6--7 7 IS' ... 
11 6--7 7 6-7 7 6-7 6 6-7 6 6--7 6 6-7 6 6--7 6 Ro 
12 6--7 6 6--7 6 6--7 6 6--7 6 6--7 6 6--7 6 6--7 6 O 
13b 6 2(223~) 6 7(l43~) 6 3(250\1) 6 6(350\1) 6 5(85~) 6 3(452\1) 6 3(215~) ~ e; 
a One set of values are drawn with replacement from the uniform distribution on [O, $9.99]. A random constant was added to all values in each period 1-12, and the 00 
~ individual assignments randomized. ...... 10 
b Each period was 4 min duration. ~ 
e Periods 1-12 were 4 min duration, period 13 was 6 min duration to allow more time for mug trading. N 
d Volume for number of mugs traded in period 13. Price in cents is shown in parenthesis. The price tag, showing $9.95 was left on each mug, and this was pointed out to ;::; 
the subjects. .l., 
N 
o-
IV 
IV 
~ 
11
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Table 8 
Comparison of UPDA bids, offers and exchange prices with choice valuations 
Group l WTAs 
Group 2 WTPs 
I statistic probo level 
I statistic probo level 
Bids 
-9.043 (0.00) 
Offers 
-8.68 (0.00) 
Prices 
-4.14 (0.00) 
0.14 (0.00) 
trade, if a trade is truly desired, the resulting distributions of bids and offers 
provide market incentive-based measures of WTA and WTP that are distinct from the 
BDM measures elicited in Groups 1 and 2 in Section 1. It is therefore of interest to 
compare the distribution of the Group 1 WTA prices with the distribution of 
closing exchange offers, and the Group 11 WTP prices with closing exchange bids. We 
report these t-test comparisons in Table 8. In these comparisons we use only the 
bid/offer data for the exchange experiments in which the mug prices were unknown, since 
this was the treatment condition in the choice data for Groups 1 and 2. Both the offer 
and the bid distributions are significantly below the corresponding Group 1 WTA 
and Group 2 WTP distributions. The choice procedure does not yield valuations that 
are good predictors of the actual bids and offers submitted in the iterative market 
setting. 
AIso in Table 8 we report comparisons of the Group 1 and 2 valuations with the sample 
of all mug prices from the exchange experiments. These comparisons show that prices are 
significantly below the Group 1 WTAs, but not the Group 2 WTPs. Thus the WTPs based 
on choice data are a better indicator of the level of exchange prices than are the WTAs. 
Coursey et al. (1987) report similar findings in their study of the disparity between WTA 
and WTP. 
In a new study using repeated second price auctions to measure WTP and WTA for 
goods with close substitutes (candy bars and mugs), Shogren et al. (1994) find no 
significant difference between the average of WTA and WTP (or price) for these goods. 
These carefully conducted new experiments cast doubt upon the WTAlWTP discrepancy 
for goods with close substitutes, and they reject the KKT hypothesis of an endowment 
effect. Thus, for mugs Shogren et al. (1994, p.265) report WTAlWTP ratios of only 1.08 
and 1.05 in two treatments on the final three trials 8-10. 
We have no disagreement with their results or conclusions. Their results are not 
inconsistent with our market results because we directly examine trading volume not the 
WTAlWTP discrepancy. It is very important to realize that mean differences between 
WTA and WTP in two situations can be indistinguishable statistically, yet trading volume 
can differ substantially. To see this look at Fig. 1. A slight decrease (increase) in the last 
four accepted bids (offers) would have no discernible effect on the difference between 
WTA and WTP, on average, but volume would decrease from 6 to 2 units. Similarly, 
variation in the WTAlWTP ratio of 1.08 to 1.05 could in our setting (and that of KKT), 
yield considerable differences in trading volume. The ratio of mean WTA to mean WTP 
in Table 4 is only 1.05, but the market trades fully, (except for the equal marginal units 
that add nothing to efficiency). 
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4. Conclusions and discussion 
This paper has reexamined the KKT experimental procedures for identifying an 
endowment effect for consumer goods; it is based on a series of individual choice 
experiments, and an independent series of market exchange experiments. 
In our choice experiments we removed all reference to buying, selling and prices and 
reformulated the task uniformly across KKT's three treatment groups as a choice 
problem. Since each experiment in the choice series was an addendum to a prior 
unrelated market experiment in which the subjects earned substantial, but highly variable 
amounts of money, we were able to obtain a measure of any effect on choices due to 
differential incomes earned or to the buyer/seller role in the previous experiment. We 
found no income ('house money') or role effects. 
Comparing the KKT results with those of our pure choice experiments we find that the 
KKT use of different instructional descriptions - buyers, sellers, choosers - seems to 
exaggerate seller's WTA, but their hypothesis of an endowment (possession) effect is 
supported by our choice data. Consequently, although we observe smaller WTAlWTP 
discrepancies, their qualitative choice results are robust under the replication procedures 
used in this papero 
The results of our mug exchange experiments parallel those of the choice experiments 
although the methodology is quite different. The training experiments using induced 
valuation generated a wide disparity in the earnings of both buyers and sellers. Since the 
buyers (sellers) subsequently submit bids (offers) for a mug we could ask whether the 
reported WTP (WTA) was affected by prior income earnings: for neither the buyers nor 
sellers was there a significant income or 'house money' effect. The theory predicts that, 
in the absence of an income effect, half of the 12 seller's mugs should trade. We observed 
this in two of the ten experiments. In seven experiments 2-4 mugs were traded, in one 5 
mugs were traded, and in one 7 were traded. This discrepancy is larger (relative to 
prediction) than observed in the token (induced value) exchange experiments, but not 
nearly as large as reported by KKT. Our exchange procedures narrow the discrepancy 
reported by KKT, but do not eliminate it. We concur with KKT that there does, indeed, 
appear to be undertrading due to an endowment effect. 
A comparison of the bid (offer) distribution in the mug exchange experiments with the 
WTP (WTA) distribution in the choice experiments shows that both the bid and the offer 
distributions in exchange are below those in the choice experiments: buyers bid less and 
sellers offer less in actual exchange than is revealed by the procedure. A similar 
comparison with the exchange mug prices reveals that the WTP distribution in the choice 
experiment is a better indicator of market value than the WTA distribution. 
We accept the Shogren et al. (1994) finding of no statistically significant difference 
between WTA and WTP (for mugs, candy bars) using second price auction measures. 
They show that the difference does indeed become trivial relative to sampling variability 
over time. But we observe undertrading relative to predictions, which is entirely 
consistent with persistent small statistical differences between WTA and WTP. 
Consequently, we are unable to reject the KKT undertrading hypothesis. Statistical 
insignificance in the WTA-WTP space is associated with economically significant 
reductions in trade. 
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As we interpret the evidence, the key hypothesis in KKT that withstands market 
scrutiny is not the disparity between WTA and WTP, but undertrading. 
Is the endowment effect an important characteristic of behavior that should concem us? 
As an observation contrary to standard preference theory it cannot be lightly dismissed. 
As a matter of practical importance in markets it is perhaps of little concem. Trade is 
almost entirely between specialist firms selling to other firms or consumers, not 
consumers selling to consumers. Garage sales are an exception to the latter where it 
appears that the propensity to truck barter and exchange is alive and well, even if there is 
undertrading. 
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